Introduction
Several accounting and other signals are generally available for the construction of a managerial performance evaluation measure on which an optimal compensation contract is based. The demand for aggregation in evaluating managerial performance arises because reporting all the basic transactions and other nonfinancial information about performance is costly and impracticable (see Ashton [1982] , Casey [1978] , and Holmstrom and Milgrom [1987] ). We identify necessary and sufficient conditions on the joint density function of the signals under which linear aggregation, a simple and commonly employed way to construct a performance evaluation measure, is optimal. This characterization suggests that the linear form of aggregation is optimal for a large class of situations. Focusing on performance measures that are linear aggregates enables us to determine the relative weights on the individual signals in the optimal linear aggregate, since these weights are invariant for all realizations of the signals. We interpret these weights in terms of statistical characteristics (sensitivity and precision) of the joint distribution of the signals. The function fa(y, z; a)/f(y, z; a) is continuously differentiable in y and z and has a support independent of a E A. We invoke the monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLRC) for the signals y and Z7 to show that the optimal compensation contract is monotonic in y and z. The principal and agent know the structure of the choice problem, their utility functions, and the set of available options. They jointly observe only the accounting signals y E Y and z E Z and of course the outcome x = x(y, z) assumed here to be a deterministic function of y and z. They also share identical state beliefs encoded in the density function f (. 
The Basic Model
To characterize the optimal contract, we employ the first-order approach, and replace (lb) with the following first-order condition assuming the usual regularity conditions.8
Tr TU[q(y, z)]fa(Y, z; a)dydz -V'(a) = 0.
(lb') Let X and it denote the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (la) and (lb'). Point-matched optimization of the Lagrangian yields the following characterization of the optimal compensation contracts for a* and q* in 6 If the compensation function is not restricted to a finite interval, the existence of an optimal solution to the principal-agent problem cannot be guaranteed. See Mirrlees [1974] . For a more precise discussion of the existence of a solution to the agency problem, see Holmstrom [1979, p. 77] .
7Whitt [1980] has shown that MLRC implies first-order stochastic dominance. Milgrom [1981] has shown that this is equivalent to the statistical inference from the observation of a higher value of the signal that the agent has taken a higher level of effort.
8 For a discussion of the validity of the mathematically more tractable first-order approach, see Mirrlees [1979] To ensure that the agency problem is nontrivial we assume that the second-best optimal action a* is greater than the minimal action a. Then, as in Holmstrom [1979] , it follows that it > 0. Banker and Maindiratta [1986] also show that 0* is differentiable on (0, 0). Differentiating (2) with respect to y and z, we obtain: 
Linear Aggregation of Accounting Signals
In this section, we examine conditions for the optimality of the simple, commonly observed linear aggregation of signals in constructing a performance evaluation measure. The optimal linear aggregate for a specific agency (which is the only problem of interest to the principal) is a function of the distribution of signals at the optimal action a*, induced by the principal, which in turn depends on the specific utility function of the agent. Consequently, for different actions a* that the principal may induce, the optimal solution to the principal's problem causes the relative weights in the linear aggregate to vary. In Proposition 1, we provide sufficient conditions under which linear aggregation is robust with respect to any action a* induced by the principal, though the relative weights in the linear aggregate may vary with a*.
Let : parameterize different agencies with U"(.) -V"(.) representing the utility function of the agent in the agency A. Let a: represent the optimal (second-best) action for agency A. If linear aggregation is to be optimal for all agencies, that is for all ad E A, then there must exist some arbitrary functions 1(a') and m(a') such that the optimal contract 0q corresponding to any given agency d can always be written in the form 0q = A(7r-), where iri = l(a')y + m(a3)z + n(aO) is some linear aggregate of y and z. PROPOSITION 1. When the principal is risk neutral, a sufficient condition for the optimal compensation contract to be written as 0q = 70 = 1(aO)y + m(a3)z for all a" E A is that the joint density function is of the form: 
where a is the agent's action choice, p(.), q(.), r(.), s(.), and t(.) are arbitrary functions of a, y, or z as indicated, and y is a scalar parameter. For this class of joint probability density functions, the conditional distribution' of the signal y I z (and also z Iy) includes many common distributions such as (truncated) normal, exponential, gamma, chisquare, and inverse Gaussian. These conditional distributions include many of the common parametric functional forms for continuous probability distributions that have been considered (to our knowledge) in the agency literature" in accounting. COROLLARY 1. If f (y, z; a) belongs to the class in (7), then k* can be written as V*(r) where r is a linear combination of y and z.
Proof. See Appendix A.
REMARK 1
We see from Proposition 1 that linear consolidation of signals is optimal for a large class of joint density functions, which includes most of the common continuous probability distributions considered in agency models in accounting. But the compensation contract A itself need not be linear in y and z for this class of distributions. That is, even though r = ly + mz is a linear function of y and z, the compensation function t(7r) need not be linear in wr (and hence in y and z). However, as observed in Banker and Datar [1986] , if the principal is risk neutral and the agent's utility function is logarithmic, U' = 1/0 and for the class in (7) the optimal 0* = X + ,j[pa(a*)y + qa(a*)z -ra(a*)] and the compensation contract itself is linear in y and z."
REMARK 2
The condition in (6) for the joint density function is sufficient to ensure that some but not necessarily the same linear aggregate of y and z is optimal for all agencies. However, it is not a necessary condition for a linear aggregate of y and z to be optimal for a specific agency with given utility functions for the principal and for the agent. Instead of evaluating the optimal linear aggregate for a specific agency (and action), our focus in Proposition 2 is to identify necessary conditions on the joint density functions of y and z with the more robust property which ensures that some linear aggregation will always be optimal, whatever the utility function of the agent and the action induced by the risk-neutral principal. Note that the joint density function considered in Remark 2 does not satisfy this more robust property. For another agency, in which the optimal action induced is other than the a* considered in the example, a linear aggregate of y and z will not be optimal, since the " In fact, since 0* = U'-[1/(X + ,ufJ/J)], a logarithmic utility function for the agent and joint density function f(y, z; a) of the class described in (7) with t(y, z) in place of t(z}yy), constitutes "almost necessary" and, of course, sufficient conditions for the optimal compensation contract 0* to be linear in the signals y and z. expression g2(a -a*)g3(y, z) will not vanish. The class of joint density functions identified in Proposition 2 is precisely the class described in Proposition 1. We are thus able to characterize the class of joint density functions for which some linear aggregation is optimal for all agencies, although the relative weights in the optimal aggregation will vary with each agency. PROPOSITION 2. A necessary (and sufficient) condition for the optimal compensation contract to be written as 0: = 4/'1(7r'),rl' = l(a3)y + m(a"))z for all possible actions a" E A is that the joint density function is of the form in (6), that is, f (y, z; a) = explfg[l(a)y + m(a)z, a]da + t(y, z)), where g( * ), 1 (a), m(a), t(y, z) are arbitrary functions.
REMARK 3
While Proposition 2 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for some linear aggregation to be optimal for all agencies 3, the weights l(a3) and m(a') vary with the optimal action a" for each agency 3. If, on the other hand, we are interested in necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of a specific ly + mz, with l and m independent of a13, we can proceed as in Proposition 2 and obtain: f (y, z; a) = exp { J ' g(ly + mz, a)da + t(y, z)} as the necessary and sufficient condition on the joint density function. We can then rewrite this condition as:
f (y, z; a) = fi(ly + mz, a)f2(y, z) for all a, y, z,
where fi() = exp[J g(ly + mz, a)dal and f2( ) = explt(y, z)}, which is precisely the condition for ly + mz to be a sufficient statistic for y and z with respect to a (see DeGroot [1970] and Holmstrom [1979] ). The notion of a sufficient statistic is not adequate for examining when some linear aggregation is optimal across all agencies and actions induced by the principal since the joint density function f(y, z; a) in (6) that characterizes this class cannot always be written in the form in (8).
REMARK 4
If the principal is risk averse, then the signals y and z will be required for determining the value of the outcome x = x(y, z) for optimal risksharing arrangements, in addition to the information required for motivating the agent as considered earlier in the case of a risk-neutral principal. That is, even when the density function f is of the form in (6), the optimal compensation function 0,y will depend on x = x(y, z) in addition to wr1 = l(a13)y + m(a13)z. Therefore, the single linear aggregate 7r will be adequate only if we can write x(y, z) = i(w1r). However, in many situations x will be some (other) linear function of y and z. In such cases, two linear aggregates w1r and x, will together be optimal.
Sensitivity and Precision of Signals
We interpret the relative weights 1(a") and m(a") in the optimal linear aggregate in terms of statistical measures summarizing the joint probability distribution of the accounting signals. For reasons of analytical tractability we focus on a subclass of the distributions in (6) identified as the necessary and sufficient conditions in Proposition 1 for some linear aggregation to be optimal in all agencies. Johnson and Kotz [1970, p. 32] note that this subclass defined by (7) is itself a fairly broad class that includes many common distributions. The class imposes few severe restrictions in that the distribution may be convex or concave and skewed on either side of the mean. It permits consideration of a large number of parameters since p(.), q(.), r(.), s(.), and t(.) are arbitrary functions. Furthermore, the class allows means, variances, and covariance to be functions of the agent's action a.12
It follows immediately from (4) and (5) that when the principal is risk neutral and linear aggregation is optimal for the class in where k is Cov(y, z) and P2 is the precision of z as defined above. We similarly define {2a = 82a kpl2/ia as the (adjusted) sensitivity of signal z.
We show, for the class of density functions defined in (7), that the weight on a particular signal in the optimal linear aggregate used for incentive purposes is directly proportional to its sensitivity and precision. 12 Although the variances and the correlation coefficient must be independent of a in the case of a normal distribution, this restriction is relaxed for some other members of the class in (7). For instance, in the case of a gamma, exponential, chi-square, or truncated normal distribution, the variances and the correlation coefficient may depend on a. The absolute value of the relative weight (-m/i) on the overhead cost signal in the optimal performance evaluation measure is independent of E(y) and E(z). It increases if the signal y is noisier (i.e., ay increases) or if y and z are more positively correlated (i.e., r increases) and decreases if the signal z is noisier (i.e., a, increases).
Our results on the use of corporate overhead costs in the divisional manager's optimal performance evaluation measure are similar in spirit to the results on relative performance evaluation, as in Baiman and Demski [1980] and Holmstrom [1982] , where the output of one agent is used in the performance evaluation of a second agent when the outputs of the two agents are correlated. Thus, the notions of sensitivity and precision, which we have employed in determining the relative weights in optimal linear aggregation, extend directly to the case of relative performance evaluation.
We next apply the results of our model to evaluate the performance of a profit center (divisional) manager whose action a affects revenue measured by ($y) and costs measured by ($ -z). The joint distribution of y and z belongs to the class in (7). It follows from Proposition 4 that the relative weight on each signal 1: m in the optimal performance evaluation measure is directly proportional to the sensitivity times precision of each signal. The noisier a signal, the smaller the weight on that signal in the agent's performance evaluation measure.17 The more sensitive a signal to changes in the manager's level of effort, the greater the weight on that signal in the manager's performance evaluation measure. 18 We refer to the product of the sensitivity and precision as the intensity of the signal. The performance evaluation measure ly + mz can be written as a function of the profit number (y + z) alone only when the intensity of the revenue signal equals the intensity of the cost signal. If the weight on the cost signal (-z) is greater than the weight on the revenue signal (y), the optimal performance evaluation measure may be written as l(y + z) + (m -l)z. The optimal performance evaluation measure then is based on the profit number (y + z) and on the more heavily weighted cost signal.
Following Holmstrom [1979] , a necessary condition for a manager to be evaluated as a profit center rather than as a cost center is that revenues be marginally informative about the manager's effort given costs. Our discussion above illustrates that this condition is not sufficient. When the sensitivity times precision of revenue (y) and costs (-z) are not equal, it is not optimal to evaluate the profit center manager on the basis of the pure profit number alone.
Individual elements of costs within a cost center are often added together to form an aggregate cost measure. In the cost accounting literature, a commonly suggested criterion for aggregation is the homogeneity of the individual cost components. Homogeneity means that the costs assigned to a particular cost pool should exhibit the same pattern of response to the various determinants of cost behavior (Shillinglaw [1972, p. 77] .19 Feltham [1977] develops this notion of homogeneity with respect to aggregation of costs into cost pools within an information economics framework to evaluate the sufficiency of the cost aggregate for a single decision maker. In a two-person setting, our results indicate that a simple equally weighted aggregation of individual cost components into a single cost pool for performance evaluation purposes is optimal if and only if the intensity (sensitivity times precision) of all individual components is the same. If the intensity of any individual cost signal is greater, the optimal performance evaluation measure will include both the aggregate cost and the cost signal whose intensity is greater.20 7 Homlstrom [1982] obtains a similar result in the case of a multivariate normal distribution.
18 Our results provide a formal economic basis for extending laboratory experiments involving accounting aggregation for single-person decision making (Barefield [1972] ) to multiperson economic settings involving evaluation of performance.
19 Shillinglaw [1977, p. 21 ] suggests that accounting data should be collected and aggregated in ways that make it easier to identify the relationships between costs and their determinants. Horngren and Foster [1987, p. 457 ] also note that Cost Accounting Standards Board regulations require homogeneous cost pools for product costing purposes. 20 Another example of linear aggregation of signals occurs in the case of an investment center. In this case, the manager's effort influences both the operating income (y) and the level of investment (-z). If the joint density function of y and z belongs to the class in (7),
Concluding Remarks
Multiple signals are commonly available for evaluating managerial performance. We distinguish between the performance evaluation measure based on basic signals and the compensation schedule based on the evaluation measure. We focus on the management accountants' role in combining detailed records (signals) into an aggregate performance evaluation measure. In Propositions 1 and 2 we identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which some linear aggregation is optimal for all agencies, and for a subclass we obtain an interpretation (in terms of the sensitivity, precision, and intensity of the individual signals) of the optimal weights in such linear aggregates. 21 An implication of our analysis is that evaluating the performance of a profit center (divisional) manager on the basis of a pure profit number will be optimal only if the sensitivity times precision (intensity) of revenue (y) and costs (-z) is equal. If the intensity of either signal is greater, the optimal performance evaluation measure will depend on the profit number and the more intense signal.
Our analysis also demonstrates that it is optimal to include noncontrollable corporate overhead expenses in the construction of the optimal divisional performance evaluation measure if corporate overheads are correlated with controllable divisional profits, a result in the spirit of relative performance evaluation, as in Holmstrom [1982] . The notions of sensitivity and precision extend directly to the case of relative performance evaluation. The absolute value of the relative weight on the signal not controllable by the agent in the optimal performance evaluation measure is directly proportional to the precision of that signal as well as the correlation coefficient between it and the other signal controllable by the agent. the optimal performance evaluation measure will look like residual income. However, the relative linear weight (m/I) for the investment signal in the optimal linear aggregate for managerial performance evaluation will depend on the intensity of the two signals and will, in general, differ from the interest rate. Moreover, for joint density functions of y and z that belong to the class in (7), the ratio measure return on investment will not be an optimal performance evaluation measure for incentive purposes. In fact, proceeding as in Proposition 2, the necessary and sufficient condition for return on investment to be the optimal performance evaluation measure for all agencies d is that J,(y, z; a'f)/f(y, z; al) = g(y/z, a')h(y, z) for all a,' E A, where g(.) and h(.) are any arbitrary functions. In other words y/z is a sufficient statistic for (y, z) with respect to the agent's action a. 21 We do not investigate the amount or extent of loss ( Comparative statics results follow immediately by differentiating R with respect to E(y), E(z), ary, uz, and r.
